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Towards a Unifi ed Theory of 
Health-Disease: I. Health as a 
complex model-object
Para uma teoria unifi cada sobre 
saúde-doença: I. Saúde como objeto-
modelo complexo
ABSTRACT
Theory building is one of the most crucial challenges faced by basic, clinical and 
population research, which form the scientifi c foundations of health practices 
in contemporary societies. The objective of the study is to propose a Unifi ed 
Theory of Health-Disease as a conceptual tool for modeling health-disease-care 
in the light of complexity approaches. With this aim, the epistemological basis 
of theoretical work in the health fi eld and concepts related to complexity theory 
as concerned to health problems are discussed. Secondly, the concepts of model-
object, multi-planes of occurrence, modes of health and disease-illness-sickness 
complex are introduced and integrated into a unifi ed theoretical framework. 
Finally, in the light of recent epistemological developments, the concept of 
Health-Disease-Care Integrals is updated as a complex reference object fi t for 
modeling health-related processes and phenomena.
DESCRIPTORS: Models, Theoretical. Health-Disease Process. 
Comprehensive Health Care.
RESUMO
A elaboração de teorias constitui um dos desafi os mais cruciais enfrentados 
pela pesquisa básica, clínica e populacional que forma as bases científi cas das 
práticas de saúde nas sociedades contemporâneas. O objetivo deste estudo é 
propor uma teoria unifi cada da saúde-doença como ferramenta conceitual para 
a modelagem da saúde-doença-cuidado à luz de abordagens da complexidade. 
Discute-se a base epistemológica do trabalho teórico no campo da saúde bem 
como conceitos relacionados à teoria da complexidade aplicada a problemas 
de saúde. Em segundo lugar, os conceitos de objeto-modelo, multi-planos de 
ocorrência, modos de saúde e complexo doença-enfermidade-moléstia são 
introduzidos e integrados numa estrutura teórica unifi cada. Finalmente, à luz de 
desenvolvimentos epistemológicos recentes, atualiza-se o conceito de integrais 
de saúde-doença-cuidado como um complexo objeto de referência ajustado 
para a modelagem de processos e fenômenos relacionados com a saúde.
DESCRITORES: Modelos Teóricos. Processo Saúde-Doença. Assistência 
Integral à Saúde.
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The British Medical Journal recently published a report 
on the limitations of current health concepts, proposing 
a defi nition of health as “the ability to adapt and self 
manage in the face of social, physical, and emotional 
challenges”.49 In the same relativistic vein, Campos28 
argued that conceptions of health as a general label, 
although applicable to different situations, states and 
processes, do not account for the wide diversity of 
socio-cultural contexts. Scholars from several scientifi c 
fi elds have emphasized the need for theoretical work 
on the health concept as a crucial effort to promote 
effective interventions in concrete health-disease 
situations.35,39,40,54-56,75,76
Time seems ripe for evaluations of philosophical, 
scientifi c, political and pragmatic implications of the 
health concept, as a key topic in contemporary research 
agendas. Unfortunately, since Canguilhem’s29 and 
Dubo’s37 classical contributions to pathological and 
ecological models of disease, not enough investment, 
institutional and intellectual, has been devoted to 
theorizing about health-disease phenomena. Reviewing 
the biomedical literature, Jadad & O’Grady50 found 
2,081 papers citing defi nitions of health; of these, 
only a handful addressed specifically conceptual 
aspects.21,25,27,55,69 A few attempts in this regard, such 
as Stempsey’s71 pathological view of disease or 
Gammelgaard’s43 evolutionary biology perspective, 
have resulted in reductionist, narrow models of disease 
and health. Exceptions are Boorse20-22 and Nordenfelt62 
who proposed comprehensive approaches for health as 
a theoretical concept. Despite remarkable insights, the 
contribution of these authors is still limited by their 
account of health as a linear object of knowledge, 
defined as the absence of disease. Indeed, theory 
building is one of the most crucial challenges faced by 
basic, clinical and population research, which form the 
scientifi c foundations of health practices in contempo-
rary societies.54
For the past 15 years, colleagues and I have developed 
a conceptual framework for modeling health in the light 
of complexity approaches.2-15,33 Results from this line 
of theoretical research allowed preliminary proposals 
of a Theory of Modes of Health8 and the concept of 
Health-Disease-Care Integrals.6 This paper is the fi rst 
of a series of essays intended to advance, revise, correct 
and abridge updated versions of such proposals, as well 
as to assess feasibility and possibilities for the inte-
gration/convergence/fusion of these approaches into a 
unifi ed theory of health-illness-sickness. Initially, I will 
introduce some concepts related to complexity theory as 
concerned to health problems. Secondly, a brief account 
of the epistemological background of theory building 
in the health fi eld will be presented. Third, I will revise 
the notion of modes of health as key to a conceptual 
INTRODUCTION
framework for modeling health-related processes and 
phenomena as a complex reference object. Finally, in 
the light of further theoretical developments, I propose 
to update the concept of Health-Disease-Care Integrals.
Beforehand, a preliminary epistemological distinction is 
needed. The basic difference between a general theory 
and a unifi ed theory is that the former is postulated as 
an all-encompassing structure of explanations, valid 
for different levels and contexts, in contrast to a unifi ed 
theory, which integrates complementary, non-exclusive 
modes of understanding, called “special theories”. 
Special theories are partial, restricted explanatory 
models of specifi c objects of research. General theories 
typically cover the totality or integrity of given fi elds 
of knowledge. Unifi ed theories address the plurality 
of facets of complex objects, thus harmonizing special 
theories, or different scientifi c approaches, into a given 
interdisciplinary problem. These terms were introduced 
along the debate on the validity of relativity theory in 
Physics46 and later on adopted for defi ning the general 
systems theory.35,51
EPISTEMOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Post-Cartesian scientifi c paradigms have promoted 
theoretical approaches and methodological devices 
more effective for tackling real-world complex 
problems.19,23,45,47,72 This set of concepts and methods has 
been designated as complexity theory.38,44,59,60 Although 
fashionable as a new strategy for producing knowledge 
in contemporary science, complexity theory is not new. 
It is a direct evolution of General Systems Theory,64 a 
remarkable conceptual framework infl uential in the 
scientifi c panorama during the 1960s.23,35,74
In this perspective, scientific enquiry implies the 
construction of models. Like maps, models are useful 
as guides for traveling through unexplored territo-
ries of reality.58 In this sense, models are not direct 
representations of an absolute reality but result from 
a reduction of selected traits of concrete phenomena 
into universal categories.41,45 Such categories are 
expressed as concepts, proposed for referencing objects 
of knowledge.19,26 Contemporary philosophers of 
science, such as Godfrey-Smith45 and Bhaskar,19 justify 
a distinction between concrete objects and conceptual 
objects. However, the concrete object of a given scien-
tifi c fi eld may well be totally non-tangible, such as 
‘energy’ for thermodynamics, ‘market’ for economics 
or ‘risk’ for epidemiology. To account for this type of 
conceptual device, Minsky proposes the terminology 
“object-symbols”, as opposed to “object-things”.58
According to Bunge,26 concept building means cons-
truction of cognitive artifacts drawn by reference to the 
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concrete world, or model-objects. Model-objects can 
be either ontological or heuristic models. Ontological 
models are analogical devices for the reference of a 
given category of being, while heuristic models are 
explanatory devices of the determination or functio-
ning of the object. Homeostatic systems are examples 
of ontological models; biomolecular causal models of 
disease are heuristic model-objects. Epistemologically 
speaking, symbolization processes (and the construc-
tion of meaning) are at the basis of such theoretical 
models, a necessary condition for stability, testability 
and communicability in science. When put into a larger 
context of explanation, model-objects may be called 
theories, or reference models according to the Bunge-
Wand-Weber approach.41
The epistemological questions pursued herewith 
relate to a central problem of complexity thinking: 
how to integrate diversity of layers of comprehension 
and plurality of planes of emergence in a multi-level, 
multi-faceted object of knowledge? In other words, how 
to deal with a complex object that is simultaneously 
one and many, part and whole, parcel and totality, 
singularity and plurality?60
Complex model-objects must be conceived with distinct 
facets and multiple dimensions, leaving room for the 
recognition of various planes of emergence, structural 
and functional hierarchies, and simultaneous levels of 
integration in complex adaptive processes. The pheno-
menological domain defi ned as the empirical fi eld of a 
given science can be modeled in terms of complexity 
theory with planes of emergence, layers of occurrence or 
“levels of anchorage”.67,68 Also, the notions of non-linea-
rity and emergence are crucial to identify complexity in 
dynamic systems.38 These are grounds for conceptually 
setting up hierarchical orders of complexity, with varied 
degrees of specifi city related to objects of investigation 
that typically imply plural, unstable, uncertain, dynamic 
connections, events and processes.
Complex models are plural, multi-modal, multi-level, 
hierarchical, non-fi nalistic, non-linear, simultaneously 
iterative and interactive, including emergence in its 
explanatory network of multiple elementary forms 
of determination. To use an example from the health 
sciences, synergic effects of risk factors, produced by 
interaction processes, may be taken generally as sources 
of emergence in epidemiological systems.6-11,31,70 In 
a study of gender, social class and race/ethnicity on 
prevalence of depressive disorders,14 gender followed 
a pattern, confi rmed in different studies worldwide: 
women´s risk for depression is twice as high as men´s. 
Social class and race/ethnicity alone yielded low-risk 
estimates. Taking all factors together, the sum of 
isolated effects of gender, social class and race/ethnicity 
would be roughly 4,6 (= 2.0 + 1.6 + 1.0, respectively). 
The actual odds ratio found in the data analysis was 
double than expected: the risk for depression was 
9-times higher for poor black women as compared to 
wealthy white men. Although unpredicted or unex-
plained by the model, the surplus-effect that emerges 
out of the internal structure of the data set (which is 
a concrete referent of the research process) and its 
occurrence cannot be denied or suppressed.
For Samaja, health is an object classifi ed as what he calls 
“complex systems with history”.68 Thus, the interdisci-
plinary fi eld of the health sciences is structured upon 
cognitive production of diverse subordinate objects, 
revealing different levels of emergency along three 
hierarchical interfaces: molecule-cell, cell-organism, 
organism-society.68 Since the human organism, as a social 
body, is a product of complex processes of exchange with 
the environment and with society, and to the extent that 
these processes contribute to determine phenotypes, the 
health concept would correspond to a fuzzy model-object 
cutting across the biological sphere of living organisms, 
the mode of life of human subjects and the perceptions 
and feelings of sick and healthy people.
From such preliminary epistemological foundations, it 
is possible to briefl y consider the accumulated heuristic 
potential in the interfaces of biosciences, social sciences 
and health sciences, providing objective conditions 
for a proposal to systematize the problem of health as 
a complex concept.1-3,11,31,44,68,70 In this regard, selected 
forms of the ‘health’ concept can legitimately subsidize 
an ontology of health as a scientifi c model-object under 
the Bunge-Wand-Weber theorem,41 shaping descriptors 
capable of empirical reference.
THEORIES OF DISEASE, NOT OF HEALTH
In analogy to opposing notions of life and death, 
Christopher Boorse20-22 conceived a biological concept 
of health as absence of disease, proposing what he 
named a “biostatistical theory of health”. His approach 
was based on four concepts: ‘normal function’, ‘refe-
rence class’, ‘disease’, and ‘health’. Normal function 
is defi ned as what is “statistically typical” in relation to 
the reference class for the species’ survival and repro-
duction. A reference class consists of the universe of 
members of a biological species of the same sex and 
age group. Disease is a reduction in the “typical effi -
ciency” involved in the normal function of members of 
a reference class. In Boorse’s approach, health equals to 
normalcy, always “in the sense of the absence of disease 
conditions”.20 The logical opposite of the disease 
concept would be theoretical (or conceptual) normalcy. 
For Boorse, there are three types of normalcy: theoreti-
cally normal, diagnostically normal, and therapeutically 
normal. The respective antagonists would fi t with the 
other levels of normalcy: diagnostically abnormal and 
therapeutically abnormal.20-22
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Kleinman, Eisenberg & Good52 defi ned disease as a 
biomedical concept that refers to alteration or dysfunc-
tion in biological and/or psychological processes, 
illness incorporates individual experience and percep-
tion of disease, and sickness refers to the societal 
reaction to problems deriving from both disease and 
illness. In this perspective, organs or physiological 
systems can function pathologically regardless of its 
recognition or perception by the individual or by the 
social environment. Young77 contends that the distinc-
tion between disease and illness in Kleinman-Good 
model is insuffi cient to account for the socio-po-
litical dimensions of the process of becoming ill. 
To overcome these limitations, Young proposes to 
replace the scheme [sickness = disease + illness] 
with a triple series of categories in equivalent hierar-
chical levels (sickness::illness::disease). Kleinman53 
partially revised this originally objectivist position, 
contending that both disease and illness are social 
constructs. Thus, one must consider different models 
capable of conceiving health and illness as resulting 
from the complex interaction among multiple factors 
at the biological, psychological, and sociological 
levels, with a glossary not limited to biomedicine.16 
Despite its interpretative sophistication, the Kleinman-
Good-Young disease-illness-sickness (DIS) model is 
congruent to Boorse’s biological theory of health as 
absence of disease.
Bibeau & Corin advanced an anthropological 
framework to study local systems of meaning and 
practices regarding health problems, implying a 
dialogic view of the DIS model.17,18,34 This framework 
was intended to connect different dimensions of 
reality, proposing a meta-synthetic approach to 
integrate interpretative and pragmatic elements for 
a cultural model of health-disease-care. According 
to these authors, popular semiology and cultural 
models of interpretation are plural, fragmented, and 
even contradictory, and do not exist as an explicit 
body of knowledge, but are formed by a varied set of 
imaginary and symbolic elements. Popular knowledge 
about disease and correlates (sickness in the DIS 
model) can be expressed and understood in terms of 
socially and historically constructed systems of signs, 
meanings, and practices of health.17,18 Such systems 
are rooted in the group’s societal and cultural values 
underlying the individual experience of falling-ill 
and the social production of sickness. In the general 
realm of symbolic production, biological, linguistic, 
and behavioral signs are transformed into symptoms 
of a given illness, acquiring cultural meanings and 
generating specifi c social reactions. In this broad 
perspective, relations between the economic-political 
context and its historical determination are explored 
as a social background for systems of meanings and 
the experience of embodied illness.34
Canguilhem produced an epistemological evaluation 
of biomedical knowledge with great potential for 
developing new theories in the health fi eld.29,30 For him, 
normalcy includes health and sickness to the extent that 
both imply a certain life norm. The threshold between 
health and sickness is singular, although infl uenced by 
cultural, socioeconomic and political instances that 
transcend the strictly individual dimension. Particularly 
concerned with concepts of health, Canguilhem30 dwells 
with the Kantian conception of health being outside the 
philosophical realm, a common-sense notion or a private 
matter, so personal that could never become a scientifi c 
concept. This idea of health as radically private and 
personal has been also defended by Gadamer,42 who 
thought that health cannot be measured because it implies 
deep personal inner processes. This author argues that, 
for its obscure character, health is an enigma; the mystery 
of health is equivalent to the mystery of life.
Canguilhem30 would agree that “philosophical health” 
escapes the reach of instruments, protocols, and scien-
tifi c methods, and overlaps subjective health. Yet health 
incorporates not only individual health, but also its 
complement, recognizable as public health (i.e., health 
made public). Referring to ethical and metaphysical 
health-related questions, this notion of public health 
would result in the notions of utility, quality of life, and 
happiness. As such, it moves away from the expert’s 
idea of public health, which refers to the state of health 
of populations and its determinants, in two senses: as 
a complement to epidemiological concepts of risk and 
as reference to broader concepts of health.
HEALTH AS PLURALITY AND TOTALITY
As seen above, Canguilhem’s health concept refers 
to simultaneous, separate but articulated, planes of 
reality: in the genotype, in the subject’s life history, in 
the human population and in shared relationships to 
the environment. Hence, while philosophical health 
in a sense encompasses individual health as a human 
right, it does not displace the possibility of measuring 
the health-related quality of life of human subjects. By 
analogy, the idea of philosophical health (e.g., health as a 
value, political or ethical) does not preclude taking health 
as a scientifi c object (health needs, epidemiological risks 
or population health). In this sense, scientifi c health 
would be public or collective health, that is, healthiness 
is constituted in opposition to the notion of sickness.
Figure 1 presents a scheme intended to merge 
Canguilhem’s position and Kleinman-Good-Young 
DIS model. The DIS model (here drawn as a Venn 
diagram) occupies the graph center. The region of 
reality immediately related to the core-object gives 
some ground to the idea of health as complementary 
to the triple dimension of the disease-illness-sickness 
set. Normal health (Boorse’s diagnosed normalcy) is 
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the complement of disease; private health (Gadamer’s 
health enigma) is the complement of illness; social 
health Bibeau-Corin’s system of signs, meanings 
and practices is the complement of sickness. In addi-
tion, the outer fi eld, where both regions of the DIS 
Complex and the dimensions of health are contained, 
hosts other transcriptions of the health concept, to be 
defi ned ahead.
Considering the defi nitions of hierarchical interfaces 
and planes of emergence, a conceptual frame may be 
useful as a basis for integrating the contributions of 
health sciences and applied social sciences in a unifi ed 
theory of health.6-8 This framework (Table 1) organizes 
the terminology used for categories of non-health avai-
lable to different health sciences, in addition to distin-
guishing between the varied defi nitions of normalcy 
and health and their potential empirical descriptors. 
It implies an effort to translate Canguilhem’s model 
into the theoretical specifi cations of Modes of Health.
The scheme proposed is an expanded glossary of 
categories of health and non-health, which, in a sense, 
incorporates and articulates a semantic demarcation of 
disease-illness-sickness and the corresponding modes 
of health. The various categories of non-health and 
health are organized according to hierarchical planes 
of emergence: sub-individual, individual, collective. 
Also, equivalent descriptors are indicated for the 
respective levels and planes.
On the subindividual and individual planes of emer-
gence, at any level of complexity, the health object 
can be examined based on a deterministic explanatory 
approach, producing structured causal metaphors. 
In this case, the aim is to construe partial facets of 
the model-object Health as biomolecular processes 
in the normal systems or sustained physiological 
processes in healthy subjects, equivalent to patho-
logical processes as manifested in a ‘case’ of a sick 
person. Thus, at the sub-individual level, normalcy 
and pathology (in the original Canguilhemian sense) 
correspond to the descriptor “state”.
For the individual, in the clinical level, normal health 
corresponds to disease (structural) and disorder (func-
tional), with “signs & symptoms” as descriptors. The 
category ‘disorder’ refers to a disease without structural 
(anatomo-pathological) lesion, which occupies a level 
equivalent to the defi nition of disease in the clinical 
sphere. Private health, as well as individual health, 
object of an “epidemiology of health”,7 corresponds to 
‘illness’, defi ned according to Canguilhem’s model. In 
the individual instance, the descriptor “health status” 
is used to objectify the person’s mode of health, and 
“feeling” refers to the intimate, private mode of health 
that cannot be made public.
The conventional epidemiological perspective of risk 
factors may also be placed into this scheme at the popu-
lation level. From this perspective, the health-disease 
object is reproduced as a specifi c concept, with risk-
-production models based on the direct action or inte-
raction of risk factors. Quantitative epidemiological 
descriptors (rates, coefficients) can deal with the 
subset’s counter-domain (of sick population groups), 
equivalent to the population residue [1 – risk].7
The descriptor “health situation” corresponds to the 
notion of public health in Canguilhem, which may be 
Normal health
S I
D
Social health Private health
(feelings)(SMPH)
(signs & symptoms)
Scientific health (concept)
Healthiness Individual
health
Philosophical Health (value)
SMPH: System of signs, meanings, and practices of health
Figure 1. Canguilhem’s Model (adapted).30
Table. Planes of Reality and Modes of Health.
Planes of emergence Categories of non-health Modes of health Descriptor
Sub-individual Pathology Normalcy State
Individual Disease Normal health Signs & symptoms
Disorder
Illness Private health Feeling
Individual health Status
Supra-individual or Collective Risk (1 – risk) Measure
Morbidity Healthiness Situation
Sickness Social health Systems smpH
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called ‘healthiness’ in contrast to the idea of morbidity 
in traditional public health discourse. Finally, the modes 
of “social health”, which are equivalent to the concept 
of sickness in interpretative medical anthropology, 
could be approached through Bibeau-Corin’s systems 
of signs, meanings, and practices of Health.19,34 In this 
case, the theory provides the possibility of incorporating 
sickness into the health concept itself, to the extent that 
it takes the experience of sickness as a way of living 
by structuring the social representation of health as 
subjectivity through the subject’s interaction with the 
material and symbolic worlds.
In sum, the scheme proposed herein may be read as an 
effort needed to build equivalences between concepts 
of health and the diversity of dimensions of disease. 
The basic conclusion of this argument is that health is 
plural, that is, it does not comprise a unique, universal, 
totalized category. Depending on planes of emergence 
and facets of the object at stake, to refer to “healths” 
or, more precisely, to various “modes of health” will 
be more respectful of the complexity of dynamic states 
and processes in the concrete health reality. The notion 
that the concept of health refers to a mutant, plural, 
relative and non-ontological object is not exactly new 
and original. Nietzsche,61 back in 1882, wrote that:
DIS: disease-illness-sickness
Figure 2. Conceptual map of the DIS complex represented as health-disease-care integrals (Almeida-Filho,6 2000).
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“For there is no such thing as health in itself, and all 
attempts to defi ne a thing in that way have lamentably 
failed. It is necessary to know your aim, your horizon, 
your powers, your impulses, your errors, and especially 
the ideals and fantasies of your soul, in order to deter-
mine what health implies even for your body. There are 
consequently innumerable kinds of health […].”
An analogy drawn from meteorology may help to clarify 
this concept of a plural, integral, complex, synthetic, 
reference model-object: What defi nes a storm? Not 
barometric pressure, or wind speed, or rainfall, or 
temperature change (all of which may be measured with 
some degree of precision), nor electric bursts, or cloud 
concentration (which can be described and registered), 
but all these phenomena combined in an integral totality 
that is recognized as such and that cannot be reduced to 
its measurements or descriptions. Following this analogy, 
it may be said that the model-object ‘health’ is, like a 
storm, a complex construct that is defi nable only in its 
broader confi guration, for it has different facets or angles, 
and that none of those angles by themselves give access 
to the object referenced in its entirety.
Along this line of enquiry, ‘health’ as a concept is 
marked by properties intuitively considered as antago-
nistic: plurality and totality. On the one hand, health-
-disease phenomena cannot be defi ned as exclusively a 
sub-individual biological effect or an individual-personal 
clinical issue or a social-environmental process.31 A 
constructive scientifi c approach to the appraisal of health 
as complexity ought to incorporate Samaja’s contri-
bution regarding multi-reality stances, which presents 
the concept’s explanatory structures as a heuristic 
model-object. Indeed, health objects are plural, multifa-
ceted, transdisciplinary, simultaneously ontological and 
heuristic models capable of cutting across (and being 
traversed by) dimensions, spheres and domains refer-
ring to different levels of complexity.3,6-8,15 On the other 
hand, to respect its integrity-totality, the model-object 
‘health’ is crucially defi ned as a meta-synthetic theore-
tical device. In sum, oriented by complexity approaches, 
model-objects such as disease-illness-sickness – the 
DIS Complex – articulated with life-function reference 
objects, must be treated as a plural-total construct: the 
health-disease-care integral.
HEALTH-DISEASE-CARE INTEGRALS
For Samaja,67,68 the reference object called health, 
as a construct, entails a large number of hierarchical 
interfaces and an enormous amount of information, 
experiences and assumptions on normality/pathology, 
treatment/prevention, healing/recovery. In order to 
compose the rationale needed for integrating the 
broader theoretical scheme proposed, consider a series 
of basic postulates.
(1) The object health in general, in its complex, plural 
nature, is an integral totality that comprises sub-objects 
operating at different planes of reality.
(2) Health objects and sub-objects are reference to 
health-disease-care phenomena as complex systemic 
models.
Figure 3. Causal deterministic model-object illustrated by (a) 
a clinical-epidemiological model (Almeida Filho,a 2012) and 
(b) a HIV/AIDS social causation model (Poundstone et al,63 
2004).
Limited Life Chances
– Education
– Employment
– Income
Emotional and
behavioral damage
– Depression
– Substance abuse
Structural
Violence
– Racism
– Sexism
– Stigma &
Discrimination
High-risk
behaviors
– Multiple partners
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(3) Health-disease-care models are organized in 
three dimensions: domains, instances, and levels of 
complexity.
(4) The dimension of domains implies classical vectors of 
philosophical inquiry, from the singular to the universal 
and from the particular to the general.
(5) The dimension of heuristic instances comprises four 
modalities of basic models: explanatory, structural, 
systemic, and synthetic.
(6) The dimension of levels expresses different degrees of 
complexity in the organization of objects of knowledge, 
from the micro to the macro level.
One sick person or a diseased body or one parti-
cular health institution all belong to the realm of the 
singular and, as such, are specimens or singular cases 
of particular, general or universal reference objects. 
Endemic or epidemic occurrence of a disease and 
organization or structure of a health system in a given 
province both belong to the realm of the particular. 
Professional taxonomies or popular disease glossaries, 
health care historical contexts, cultural cosmolo-
gies, are manifested in the general domain. Cancer, 
immune-defi ciency, risk, survival, health care (taken 
as constructs or theoretical categories) are pertinent 
to the universal domain.
Figure 2 represents a graphical synthesis of some of the 
critical topics of this paper, organized according to the 
assumptions pointed out above.6 Despite being a sketchy, 
preliminary account of complexity in health-disease-care 
integrals, this model is intended to depict visually the 
major lines of thought underlying this proposal, oriented 
towards setting the baseline for a special theory of disease 
nested in an integrated or unifi ed theory of health.
In the dimension of heuristic instances, several 
health-disease-care objects may be construed and arti-
culated to form the DIS Complex. Causal models of 
disease in individuals and risk models in populations 
are explanatory heuristic instances, food chains and 
health systems are systemic models, biological mecha-
nistic models and vulnerability processes are structural 
instances, descriptors of health situations and narratives 
of care itineraries are synthetic heuristic instances. The 
designation of such instances as ‘validation patterns’ 
is justifi ed because they are subject to direct sources 
of conceptual validity, which are internal to particular 
paradigms and specifi c fi elds of scientifi c knowledge.67
As applied to health-related processes, the dimension 
of levels of organization is integrated as a complex 
of hierarchical inter-contained sets. Molecules, cells, 
tissues, organisms; persons; families; neighborhoods; 
organizations; cities; nations; societies; environments. 
At any level of complexity, the DIS Complex can be 
examined from several angles, referred by different 
classes of model-objects, drawn according to various 
combinations of domains, instances and levels. Let us 
do it by decomposing the conceptual map presented 
in Figure 2. As an illustration of each class of these 
model-objects, I have collected different schemes 
used in the literature for representing HIV/AIDS and 
correlate issues.a
In the explanatory instance, a determinant-based 
approach (or a “strong deterministic model”) is made 
of highly structured causal metaphors operating in the 
domain of the singular. This heuristic instance depicts 
one of the facets (perhaps the most tangible one) of 
the model-object related to individual health: patho-
logical processes manifested as a “case of disease”. 
The product of the explanatory determinant instance 
is a kind of fi nalistic, linear model-object that may be 
called a semblance-object, as proposed by Clavreul 
(1982).32 In this sense, the term semblance is meant as 
a malleable clear-cut profi le, paradoxically without the 
rigor and precision of computable objects. The paradox 
is that only semblance-objects can tolerate hard, rigid, 
causal metaphors of the clinical kind. A set of scientifi c 
disciplines established around this facet of the totalized 
object of health-disease-care has been considered in 
historical terms,39 epistemological terms,68 and semio-
logical terms.17,18
A model-object of this class is presented in Figure 3. 
Note that this model is formed by discrete elements, 
linked with univocal, linear, monotonous, necessary 
relationships of causal determination, leading to the 
production of disease through deterministic causal 
pathways. Two examples of this model-object are 
also presented in Figure 3: a clinical-epidemiological 
modeling of AIDS etiology and a HIV/AIDS psycho-
social causation model.63 In the former, a singular 
specimen or given case of AIDS is modeled conside-
ring the mechanistic action of causes, contaminants, 
infectious  forces, biological pathogens and individual 
susceptibility patterns. In the latter, a compound of 
life chances, psychosocial damages and high-risk 
behaviors is considered as necessary cause for the 
disease to occur clinically.
Relations of necessity (or causes) rule model-objects 
of this class. They fi t simplifi cation-prone frameworks 
better than complexity theoretical approaches. To model 
this segment of the health-disease-care complex, equi-
valent to drawing the causal model-object, analogical or 
abductive logic is more appropriate and it can be defi ned 
a Almeida-Filho N. Modelos complejos de enfermedad: notas y esbozo de aplicación al HIV/SIDA. Salvador, Bahia: Instituto de Saúde 
Coletiva/Universidade Federal da Bahia; 2012 [cited 2013 Jul 16]. Available from: http://www.scribd.com/doc/110651522/MODELOS-
COMPLEJOS-DE-ENFERMEDAD-NOTAS-Y-ESBOZO-DE-APLICACION-AL-HIV-SIDA
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as analogical logic 1. The notion of abduction, derived 
from Peirce’s philosophy, according to Samaja (1996),67 
is useful when “neither deduction nor induction could 
operate. In fact, deduction allows predictions only if 
the theory and the case are established, and induction 
allows only to verify (falsify or corroborate) these 
particular predictions.”
Still in the explanatory pattern, one can fi nd a different 
class of determinant model-objects, represented in 
Figure 4. Operating in the epistemological domain of 
the universal, such a heuristic device is opposite to the 
clinical model-object built through causal reasoning in 
the domain of the singular. Rigorously speaking, they 
are concept-objects based upon a particular defi nition of 
chance modifi ed from probability theory. Model-objects 
derived from this approach are supposedly grounded 
on probabilistic inductive logic, but actually they use 
a special kind of non-stochastic logic, which could 
be called quasi-inductive or inferential logic. For this 
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Figure 4. Conditional risk as a deterministic model-object illustrated by (a) a social-epidemiological model (Almeida-Filho,a 
2012) and (b) a Health QOL correlates of HIV/AIDS (Hansen et al,48 2009).
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Figure 5. Structured model-object illustrated by (a) AIDS multidimensional context (Poundstone et al 2003) and (b) HIV pa-
thogenesis structure (Bernstein 1992).
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reason, such a class of model-objects may be considered 
as part of a “weak deterministic model”.
The facet of the health-disease-care integral reproduced 
therein constitutes a specifi c concept-object, designated 
for our purposes as Risk 1, which corresponds to the 
classical epidemiological notion of risk. Built upon 
what is left from statistical determination, after ruling 
out stochastic basic explanations for phenomena of 
disease occurrence, risk is not a true probability but 
rather it constitutes a frequency-based pseudo-probabi-
lity.4,6 Confi rming its pragmatic character as a black-box 
heuristic device, fi nalistic, monotonous models of this 
kind produces a residue-object, resulting from the direct 
action or inter-action of risk factors.
In Figure 4, the conventional epidemiological pers-
pective (the so-called epidemiology of risk factors) 
is illustrated by an epidemiological model of social 
determination of HIV/AIDS and a model of HIV/AIDS 
correlates of health-related quality of life.48 In the fi gure, 
F1, F2,... to Fn are risk factors, defi ned within limits 
of probability of occurrence. Note in both cases that 
arrows do not represent necessary, absolute, univocal 
links but rather conditional probabilities, and that the 
elements that compose determinant systems of this kind 
are still discrete entities.
Let us move on to the structural instance, initially in the 
domain of the particular, where we can fi nd a class of 
models that extract their heuristic capacity from topo-
logical objects. The structure is a matrix that consists 
precisely of invariants, the core is what remains as 
substrate after changing in the structure (and not of the 
structure). These are space-based metaphors drawn for 
referencing the action of particular invariant structures 
in the form of conditioners of processes. In Figure 5, in 
its general format, Co1, Co2,... to Con are conditioning 
elements, actually defi ning limits of variation. Such 
model-object is a matrix of constraints, or better, a 
structure that “constrains” the variation or change.
The product of these model-objects is generally states, 
which, for either singular or collective phenomena, could 
also be explained by deterministic models. This is repre-
sented in the basic drawing in Figure 5 as the CM (causal 
model) core, reference to disease states. Deterministic 
model-objects explain the occurrence of cases while 
structural model-objects refer to health-disease states. 
This class of stratifi ed topological models has been 
dominated by classical deductive logic as the main source 
of internal consistency and external validation. What is 
most interesting is that this kind of model-object operates 
by confi guring tracks for “change” made possible by 
structures, which in turn result themselves from “subor-
dinate structural processes.”
This class of structural models of health-disease is more 
effi cient for understanding conservation processes of a 
given “state of affairs”. Several partial and full exam-
ples of such model-objects can be found in biological 
and social sciences in a perspective that, generally 
designated as “structuralism”, stands in opposition to 
complexity theory.60 The multidimensional contextual 
modeling of population HIV/AIDS incidence proposed 
by Poundstone et al,63 Bowen’s multilevel ecological 
model of HIV risk context24 and the classical Root-
Bernstein’s HIV pathogenesis model65 are examples 
of hierarchical structures that converge, respectively, 
to supra-individual and sub-individual model-states.
Covering one of the facets of health-disease-care 
integrals, now in the domain of universality, another 
class of structural model-objects is confi gured around 
matrices of possibilities. They are generally hierar-
chical matrix models, converging to fi xed logical 
forms that indicate possibilities of the structure. The 
potentiality (or virtuality) of this heuristic device 
derives from the operation of a logic framework that 
generates possibilities for the occurrence of events 
“deduced” from the compilation of information 
and integration of knowledge produced by applica-
tion of related models of determinant explanation. 
Model-objects derived from this approach actually use 
a special kind of deductive logic, which I propose to 
call “possibilistic” or quasi-deductive logic. Formally, 
logical maps of the format shown in Figure 6 are 
congruent to such structured model-objects. In its 
general format, Po1, Po2,... to Pon are conditioning 
elements, defi ning limits of possibilities.
In the health field, several disciplinary applied 
subfields - for example, occupational health and 
health surveillance - ground their theoretical practice 
in model-objects of this kind. Outcomes of such 
model-objects may be referred to as Risk 2, in which 
the notion of risk is much closer to the common-sense 
concept of risk-danger as a potential, hidden threat. 
Indeed, model-objects of health-disease of this kind 
are more effi cient for describing structures that are 
supporting a given set of interconnected processes. 
In Figure 6, model-objects of this class (possibilistic 
structural risk) may be illustrated by two different 
conceptual maps of Risk/Hazard/Vulnerability related 
to HIV/AIDS.36
In the instance of dynamic systems, now in the domain 
of the particular, heuristic devices of this class may 
be defi ned by sensitivity to their own systemic move-
ment. Such a kind of model-object is non-fi nalistic 
and non-linear, incorporating better possibilities for 
dealing with ruptures, ambiguities, inconsistencies and 
contingencies. As shown in Figure 7, in its basic general 
format, Dn1, Dn2,... to Dnn are dynamic elements, indi-
cating nodes of a complex network. Such artifacts tend 
to be cyclical, iterative, interconnected. To the limit, 
they can have a hyper-hierarchical fractal structure (in 
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Figure 6. Structural risk as a possibilistic model-object illustrated by (a) HIV/AIDS Hazard/Vulnerability model (Almeida-Filhoa 
2012) and (b) Risk Vulnerability model (Donenberg & Pao,36 2005).
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the sense that each Dn can hold lower-order processes 
organized as a network with fractal structure similar to 
the general network). As they are confi gured, products 
of those model-objects are networks of processes that 
produce networks of processes. The predominant logic 
in these model-objects is concerned with general laws of 
movement-variation; it may be called a type 1 dialectic.
The facet that corresponds to this instance/domain of 
the integral-object health-disease takes the general form 
of “health-disease-care dynamic systems,” generated 
by iterative and interconnected systemic models. The 
potentiality of this approach to build systemic models 
applicable to health promotion and disease prevention 
is enormous. With this aim, one needs to identify hubs, 
“hot spots” or critical points where interventions of 
low-grade power shall provoke potentiated syner-
gistic effects with higher potential for transformation. 
In Figure 7, disease processes are represented by a 
systemic model-object, along with two examples of 
this kind of model: a system network of determination 
of HIV/AIDS and a complex model information and 
help seeking behavior for AIDS patients.73
As seen in Figure 2, there are facets of the health-disease-
care integral that have not been targeted by early 
attempts at formalizing health-disease model-objects. 
Models composed by non-discrete elements, with 
blurred boundaries between elements and unclear limits 
between the system itself and outer contexts are called 
fuzzy systems, form a class of model-objects defi ned 
by “prototypical properties”, degree of polysemy 
and “mutant properties” of composing elements.57,66 
Located in the transition from systemic to synthetic 
instances, prototype models are open to rich possibi-
lities of dealing with traits-signs-types of immaterial 
occurrence, either linguistic or conceptual. In this 
framework, signs are semiologic objects that indi-
cate (other) objects of a similar class, traits are signs 
indexing a property of the model-object, types imply 
pertinence to categories, and prototypes are types with 
degrees of pertinence.
In the domain of the general, both approaches comprise 
unstructured objects. For decades, such model-objects 
hindered any attempts at formalization. More consistent 
and rigorous criteria for logical treatment of these new 
objects only recently have been established.66 As far as 
logical consistency and validity are concerned, both 
approaches need a different kind of transitive logic: 
from possibilities or degrees of pertinence to “boundary 
ramps” and to a degradé of prototypical limits. Fuzzy 
set logic have been developed as possible sources for 
logical criteria to validate such models. I propose to 
consider in the scheme transitive logics of this kind as 
part of a type 2 dialectic.
Finally, let us examine the synthetic instance of the 
health-disease-care integral model of Figure 2. In 
this instance, emerging model-objects may be fi gured 
directly by images or visual metaphors, ruled by a 
general kind of transformation, which I propose to 
call anamorphosis 1, or by a particular kind of trans-
formation, which may be called anamorphosis 2. 
This synthetic instance allows to incorporate, into a 
unifi ed model-object, different classes of reference: 
a) propositional models, which assume logical forms 
that specify elements, properties and relationships of 
comprehensive structures; b) iconic models, schemata 
and graphic and visual forms that, in varied ways, 
convey an ideological imagery of health-disease; c) 
metaphorical models, which result from the ability 
of a propositional or iconic model to pass from one 
domain to another; d) metonymic models, which result 
from displacements, dislocations and substitutions, 
again across domains and planes of occurrence of 
health-illness-care phenomena.
In both domains of generalness and particularity, the 
rationale of these model-objects is justifi ed by a class 
of analogy distinct from abduction, which I propose 
to name as analogical logic of type 2. This logic is 
mostly metonymic, based on hermeneutical processes 
of double contextualization, that is, simultaneous refe-
rence to theory-engendered objects and to objects that 
encompass “real world” contingencies.
In sum, levels, domains, logics, models, products, 
objects, forms are condensed to produce synthetic 
complex model-objects, such as the example of a 
prototypical model – object illustrated by a semio-
logical model of social perception of HIV/AIDS17 
shown in Figure 8. These are polisemic, multifaceted, 
pluralistic model-objects, simultaneously ontological 
and heuristic, capable of transiting across (or being 
traversed by) different domains or levels. In this appa-
rently chaotic modeling process, health can be defi ned 
as a confi guration, one of these many synthetic forms 
that, like a storm, make sense only as an integral. Take 
HIV/AIDS as an example: AIDS is more than ‘disease’ 
in the clinical sense, more than ‘injury’ in the histolo-
gical meaning, more than ‘risk 1’ in the epidemiological 
sense, more than ‘risk 2’ under the health environmental 
sense, more than being a ‘process’ in the ecological 
sense, beyond a ‘prototype’, in the semiological sense, 
and not reducible to a form’, component of the social 
imaginary. AIDS is all of this, plus the transformation 
of each of these facets, namely, its historicity.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have proposed a conceptual background 
for a unifi ed theory of health, based on two constructs: 
the DIS Complex, as a reference for disease-states, 
and ‘health-disease-care integrals’, reference model 
for health-states. Along this line, health-disease-care 
should be taken as more than a composite reference 
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object, but rather as one of those synthetic forms that, 
since they refer to the concrete world, are built by refe-
rence to phenomena, individual and collective, targeted 
by the so-called health sciences. In this perspective, a 
broad statement can be issued: 
Health is a unifi ed model-object formed by the 
synthetic ensemble of modes of being, emerging 
from the articulation of all patterns, comprising 
domains, levels and logics, as well as models, 
products and objects related (and drawn by refe-
rence) to phenomena of life, function, performance, 
production, suffering, affliction, illness, care, 
healing and death in human subjects, groups and 
social institutions.
Rigorously speaking, this proposition is not a discrete 
conceptual defi nition since it basically outlines compo-
sition and localization patterns of the complex object 
health, without the heuristic power of differentiating 
this set of phenomena from other related phenostruc-
tured objects. Modeling complexity ends up producing 
synthetic forms that, overdetermined by different species 
of determinants, transcend the formal properties of 
discrete model-objects.14,45,47,72 In this sense, integrals 
are meta-synthetic reference objects, that is, they express 
more than a “synthesis of multiple determinations”. The 
key point of this paper’s argument is that constructs of 
this kind form a new family of scientifi c objects, i.e., 
model-objects defi ned not by their components, func-
tional principles, and dimensions but rather by their tota-
lity and general principles, over all planes of emergence.
Indeed, health-disease processes and related phenomena 
imply a peculiar class of synthetic model-objects.
As such, they are not amenable to the production 
of knowledge by way of fragmentation (hence, 
objects adverse to analytical processes) but by way 
of synthesis and complex modeling.31,47 They end 
Figure 7. Disease processes as a systemic model-object illustrated by (a) a network model of HIV/AIDS determination 
(Almeida-Filho,a 2012) and (b) a complex model of HIV/AIDS information/help-seeking behavior (Veinot,73 2010).
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up being polysemic-polymorphic model-objects, 
simultaneously ontological and heuristic, construed 
for (and by) reference to the phenomenological 
dimensions of health research. Model-objects of this 
kind tend towards a higher degree of abstraction to 
become meta-synthetic objects, construed for (and 
by) reference to the reality produced by the so-called 
health sciences.
The properties of holistic plurality of health-disease-care 
integrals and similar heuristic objects have been 
explored poorly in present-day scientifi c practice. To 
reduce the complexity of the health-disease object to 
unidimensional concepts such as risk, hazard, disease, 
defi ciency, lesion, and other ontological devices of this 
kind, despite the undeniable effective applications for 
technology building and practical interventions, implies 
missing the epistemological core that defi ne it as an 
object of knowledge.
In sum, the fundamental epistemological question 
in modeling health-disease for approaching the 
multifaceted totality of ‘health’ as a complex object 
consists precisely of identifying structuring interfaces. 
In this regard, complex model-objects in health may 
be prototypical for the desired integration between 
social sciences (e.g., with the macro-social processes 
represented as composition of elements at the basis of 
the model), logic and semantics (to justify links among 
factors in sub-models) and public health or clinical 
sciences (responsible for modeling health outcomes). 
Therefore, for further developments, we hope resear-
chers and scholars to start conceptualizing “health” in 
a way that respects its integrality and plurality, in the 
rich and complex reality of the fi eld of human health.
A forthcoming article of this series is an effort, 
yet partial and provisional, to formulate a “special 
theory” for this class of objects, which are refe-
rence to non-health complex phenomena commonly 
named as disease, illness or sickness, combining the 
notions of over-determination, multi-levelness and 
cross-dimensionality.
Figure 8. Disease as a prototypical model-object illustrated by a semiological model of social perception of HIV/AIDS 
(Bibeau,17 1992).
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